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New Presbyter Meets Old Priests: Conciliarism and Conscience in Samuel Rutherford’s 
Free Disputation  
1. Introduction 
Samuel Rutherford, the leading Scottish Covenanter and Reformed theologian, is well known 
for the anti-tolerationist arguments he put forward in his 1649 Free Disputation against 
Pretended Liberty of Conscience – a provocative title which almost speaks for itself. In this he 
argued that rightly-grounded decisions of the Church take priority over individual liberty of 
conscience.1 Yet in an earlier, more famous, work, the Lex Rex of 1644, Rutherford had 
defended passionately the rights of subjects to rebel against their lawful Prince in defence of, 
among other things, their liberty of conscience.2  While we might be tempted to see in this a 
kind of volte-face, in fact it was nothing of the kind. Rather, as I shall argue, Rutherford’s 
apparently contradictory stance on liberty of conscience makes perfect sense when we consider 
the profound debt of his political theology to late medieval and early modern Conciliarist 
currents of thought. Within the context of the great fifteenth-century Councils of Constance 
and Basel, Conciliarism urged the supreme authority of the Council over the Pope and laid an 
important basis for community sovereignty, covenantally-conditioned notions of rule and the 
rights of the individual. Refracted into the context of early modern Scottish Presbyterianism 
these same principles led Rutherford to articulate a high view of individual rights and consent 
while maintaining a strong stance on unity and uniformity.   
The connection between Conciliarism and early modern politics is one that scholars have long 
been aware of. In 1900 John Neville Figgis famously referred to Haec Sancta, the 1415 decree 
of the Council of Constance which asserted the ultimate authority of the Church over the Pope, 
as ‘probably the most revolutionary official document in the history of the world’.3 While 
subsequent historians have often blanched at such a remarkable claim, Figgis argued forcefully 
for the roots of early modern constitutionalism in late medieval Conciliarism. Of course, as 
both Francis Oakley and Cary Nederman have cautioned, it would be unwise to draw a direct 
line between the two.4 Yet as Oakley’s own work has demonstrated, not to mention Quentin 
Skinner’s magisterial Foundations of Modern Political Thought, the connections are both 
evident and pervasive.5 Moreover, going beyond Figgis, it has become clear that  Conciliarism 
not only had a significant influence on the rise of constitutionalism, but that it also profoundly 
shaped the emergent discourse of radical politics. From the French Monarchomachs of the 
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sixteenth century to the English Puritans of the seventeenth century, Conciliarist influence is 
plain to see.6 
Within a seventeenth-century Scottish context the influence of Conciliarism on politics and 
political theory might be expected to be especially potent. For Rutherford and his fellow 
Covenanters received Conciliarism not as a foreign import, as perhaps their English brethren 
did, but as a domestic product which they were eager to export. From the fifteenth century 
onwards Scots had played an important role in the international Conciliarist movement.7 In the 
early sixteenth century the Scotsman John Mair, in his day perhaps the most famous scholastic 
theologian at the University of Paris, together with his French pupil Jacques Almain, had 
provided important momentum for the revival of Conciliarism and its ongoing transformation 
into a constitutional theory of state. Through his later position as a Professor of Theology at St 
Andrews, Mair influenced a whole generation of Scottish Reformers, including John Knox, 
John Winram and George Buchanan. These not only thoroughly radicalised their teacher’s 
Conciliarist critique of the contemporary Church but also combined it with a nascent, Reformed 
covenantal ideology ready for their seventeenth-century successors to draw on.8 
Rutherford’s own connection to Conciliarism has certainly not gone unnoticed, with both 
Coffey and Oakley drawing attention to it.9 In his ground-breaking Lex Rex, as well as his 
monumental ecclesiological works The Due Right of Presbyteries and The Divine Right of 
Church-Government and Excommunication, the names of Almain and Mair, as well as of 
fifteenth-century Conciliarists like Jean Gerson, Pierre d’Ailly and Nicholas of Cusa are readily 
apparent.10 Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere, the entire argument of the Lex Rex can only 
be fully understood within an explicitly Conciliarist framework.11 Yet the connection between 
Rutherford’s Conciliarism and his controversial discussion of conscience and toleration is one 
that has not been elucidated. For it is arguably not only the Lex Rex, with its stirring defence 
of individual rights and conscience, which breathes Conciliarism, but also the controversial 
Free Disputation, which Owen Chadwick pungently referred to as the ‘ablest defence of 
persecution in the seventeenth century’ but which some more recent scholars have seen as itself 
an important defence of Presbyterian rights.12 
To see this may be to begin to challenge a widespread assumption that Conciliarism survived 
into early modernity only through shedding its embarrassing ecclesiological trappings. Rather, 
Rutherford’s discussion shows how closely ecclesiology and politics remained entwined in the 
discourse of the mid-seventeenth century. As Timothy Stanton has argued, it was John Locke 
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who in his famous 1689 Letter concerning Toleration really cut the tie between ecclesiology 
and politics, and who did so quite explicitly in order to make room for toleration. Indeed, 
Locke’s notion of the Church as a voluntary community is worlds-away from Rutherford’s 
Conciliarist vision of a unified Church and state.13 In re-examining Rutherford’s anti-
tolerationism and its Conciliarist grounding we therefore gain a new perspective on the later 
toleration debate and its political and ecclesiological moorings. In what follows, I will therefore 
seek not only to explore Rutherford’s notion of right and conscience, but also to place it  in 
explicit dialogue with the mature Locke.  
2. Natural Liberty and Natural Right 
Rutherford’s account of political society was shaped by a prevailing Augustinianism, which 
viewed political society as a remedy for sin. 14 While he regarded domestic or familial structures 
as natural, he maintained that all polities beyond this required the consent of the community.  
In explaining this transition Rutherford drew on two very different narratives of the origin of 
government, innovatively seeking to fuse a discourse of natural liberty and a discourse of 
natural rights. Indeed, it is within the fruitful dialectic between liberty and rights that 
Rutherford begins to construct his distinctive account of political community. At the same time, 
the inherent tensions between these two accounts goes some way towards explaining the 
seeming contradictions between Rutherford’s view of individual rights. 
It is undoubtedly in his account of natural liberty that Rutherford comes closest to Locke and 
his famous theory of the social contract. It is unknown whether or not Locke knew Rutherford’s 
work directly, although a definite proximity of thought has been detected between the two.15  
Regardless of the precise connection, an affinity between the two is scarcely surprising, for 
Rutherford’s account of natural liberty is itself entirely dependent on that of the sixteenth-
century Spanish jurist Fernando Vázquez de Menchaca.16 As Annabel Brett has argued, 
Vázquez was at the beginning of an entirely new discourse of individual rights and liberty 
which germinated in the reflections of John Selden, Hugo Grotius and Thomas Hobbes and 
ultimately came to fruition in Locke himself.17 
Drawing on Vázquez, Rutherford held that the origin of political communities was in people 
gathering together for the purpose of self-defence, appointing magistrates and establishing a 
penal law code. For humans living East of Eden, entering into political society thus required 
the sacrifice of an original state of liberty and the acceptance of a new and voluntary state of 
servitude. Since such subjection could hardly be natural in character, it required the active 
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consent of the individual.18 In this we may find an important analogy with the later Locke.  For, 
like Rutherford, Locke sharply distinguishes the paternal and political and is insistent that the 
pre-political state of nature is essentially a realm of freedom.19 Indeed, Locke’s teaching on the 
origins of government is precisely that men who are free by nature consent to leave the ‘liberty 
of the state of nature’ and place themselves under the authority of the community.20 Likewise, 
his ‘very strange doctrine’ that ‘in the state of Nature every one has the executive power of the 
law of Nature’, amplified by his use of Cain as an example,21 clearly resonates with 
Rutherford’s Vázquezian claim that the foundation of all political society is the principle that 
‘it is lawful to repel violence with violence’.22 
Despite all these affinities, however, there is a fundamental gulf between Rutherford and 
Locke, ultimately as wide as the gap between covenant and contract. To see this we need to be 
clearer about the difference between these two notions. While both covenant and contract 
introduced an important element of conditionality into political discourse they did this in quite 
different – and sometimes radically different – ways.  In our context, a contract can be seen as 
a horizontal relationship between human parties which establishes in a legally-binding manner 
the rights that each party have and the nature of their relationship. By contrast, a covenant could 
be understood as either vertical – between God and humanity – or horizontal – between human 
parties – in character. Even when considered as purely human in character it was still often 
understood as conditioned by a prior divine covenant. Its binding authority was thus seen as 
divine and not only human in nature, with its transgression carrying correspondingly higher 
sanctions – even if these were not strictly legally admissible. In early modern discourse the 
transition from covenant to contract, is commonly seen in the wake of Skinner as involving a 
move from religious duty to political right, although this is arguably to make too sharp a 
distinction. Finally, covenant certainly involved a level of reciprocity – and of mutual self-
binding – distinguishing it from a purely contractual account of rights.23 
For Locke the formation of political community involved the surrendering of the right to take 
the law of nature into one’s own hands, which he evocatively describes as ‘giving up’ a right 
to the commonwealth.24 By contrast, as John Ford and John Coffey rightly point out, 
Rutherford distances himself markedly from any such contractual or transactional 
understanding, in which a political community is formed through a transfer of rights from the 
people to the ruler.25 As he explains: 
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Individuall persons in creating a magistrate, doth not properly surrender their right, 
which can be called a right; for they do but surrender their power of doing violence to 
these of their fellows in that same communitie; so as they shall not now have morall 
power to do injuries without punishment; and this is not right or libertie properly, but 
servitude: for a power to do violence and injuries, is not liberty, but servitude and 
bondage.26 
Thus, what is a right for Locke pertaining to the state of nature, is for Rutherford simply a 
marker of human sinfulness. Likewise, what is for Locke a contractual relation, and indeed the 
heart of the social contract itself, is for Rutherford better understood in covenantal terms, as 
becomes evident throughout the Lex Rex. 
Responding to Richard Tuck, Oliver O’Donovan has reminded us of the dangers of reading 
modern connotations into early modern notions of ‘right’. As O’Donovan cautions, the 
difference in view here is one between ‘earlier’ notions of ‘right’ (ius) as objective and 
relational and ‘later’ conceptions of ‘rights’ as subjective and individualistic – conceptions 
which had their apogee in the Enlightenment but are generally taken as having their origins in 
late medieval thought.27 Thus despite all his pronounced emphasis on the natural liberty of the 
individual, Rutherford is clear that there can be no right which exists outside the objective 
framework of law.28  In this he echoes an older, scholastic, tradition of natural rights, prominent 
in the French Concilarists Jean Gerson and Jacques Almain, which saw right as a power, or 
faculty, conditioned by divine law.29    
Following Almain, Rutherford therefore seeks to fuse the objective right of the Thomist 
tradition with the discourse of subjective rights present in Ockham and Gerson. Likewise, he 
also seeks to integrate the rights of the individual with the rights of the community. While the 
people may decide to confer on the magistrate the power of the sword for their own well-being, 
in doing so they no means cede their own right of self-preservation, which is indeed 
inalienable.30 The prince therefore does not rule absolutely over his people but only 
conditionally.  
3. Covenant and the Right of Resistance 
For Rutherford this notion became enshrined in the covenant made before God between the 
King and his people at his coronation and renewed with each successive monarch. From the 
Bible he found clear evidence of ‘an oath betwixt the King and his people, laying on, by 
reciprocation of bands, mutuall civill obligation upon the King to the people, and the people to 
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the King’. Such a covenant, he held, is made between the King and people in which ‘both bind 
themselves before God to each other’. In making it the King binds himself to uphold the cause 
of true religion and to govern his subjects justly, while in turn the people bind themselves to 
all due obedience to their sovereign. Following the conventional understanding of a covenant 
Rutherford held that it both placed each party under an obligation and gave them a right (ius) 
over the other in case of their defaulting.  Against his Royalist opponents, he clearly saw this 
as not only a two-way covenant but also one that was properly coercive, so that the people had 
both the power and the right to punish its default, and utterly binding in the sight of God.31 In 
this, as we shall see below, we also find the seeds of his resistance theory.   
Before we turn to the more extreme implications of this covenantal model, however, it is 
important to realise how it functions in ordinary political life to limit the powers of the King 
and constrain his actions. Rutherford’s conviction is that the King holds his office in trust and 
must always act according to the Word of God and for the well-being of the people – salus 
populi suprema lex.32 He therefore does not flinch from calling the King the ‘servant of the 
people’33 or from arguing that the King is a steward of his kingdom ruling it for the good of his 
people.34 In support of this view Rutherford cites Vázquez and others of the ‘learnedst jurists’, 
but he could just as easily have cited Gerson, Almain or Mair.35 Rutherford also recognised the 
parliamentary estates as an important safeguard preventing the King from trespassing against 
the rights of his subjects, and he held the King to be bound in covenant to parliament.36   
Towards the end of Lex Rex we find a revealing discussion of the relation between King and 
Parliament. According to what he calls the “fountaine-power” Rutherford holds that the “King 
is subordinate to the Parliament, and not coordinate; for the constituent is above that which is 
constituted”. According to the executive power the two together make a “total and compleat 
soveraigne power”. Yet Rutherford insists that “royall power parliamentarie without the 
Parliament is null, because it is essentially but a part of the Parliament, and can work nothing 
separated from the Parliament”. In this sense, royal power is seen to be a “always a creature of 
the communitie” from whom it flows to the King through the channel of the representative 
estates.37 Rutherford’s language of ‘fountain power’ draws on an important trope of late 
medieval and Renaissance politics,38 but it comes particularly close to the view of Mair that 
the ‘supreme inabrogable fontal power [of sovereignty] is in the free people’.39 In practice, this 
Conciliarist view can be seen to lead to an important division of labour between the King and 
the estates. While they governed conjunctly the power for execution of laws lay more in the 
King, while the legislative power resided more in the estates – where it had its fountain origin.   
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Just as the King bound himself to the estates for matters of the material common good, so also 
he bound himself to both the estates and the Kirk in matters of the spiritual common good. In 
both the Lex Rex and the Due Right of Presbyteries Rutherford therefore cites the Conciliarists 
and jurists quite explicitly in support of his doctrine of ecclesiastical government, with its 
intricate system of checks and balances. Guiding Rutherford’s thought are two key principles.  
The first is that only Christ is to be considered the Head of the Church. Against both Catholics 
and Anglican Royalists he held that ‘no mortall man hath shoulders for so glorious a head’, for 
this headship is ‘proper and incommunicably reciprocall’ with Christ as divine mediator.40 The 
second is that Rutherford held that all offices in the Church derive immediately from Christ but 
are given ‘mediately and conditionally by the intervening mediation of the ruling and 
ministerial Church’.41 Here, it should be pointed out, we have a clear analogue of the institution 
of Kings, which comes both immediately from God and through human mediation.42 At the 
same time, however, there is also an important disanalogy. Following Almain, who was always 
careful to sharply distinguish the natural institution of the state from the supernatural institution 
of the Church,43 Rutherford differentiates between the civil power, which is natural and has its 
fountain origin in the community, and the ecclesiastical power, which is supernatural and 
grounded in Christ. Sounding a faintly ominous note in the midst of the seventeenth century 
Church-state struggle, he is also emphatic that ‘Christ is not ruled by our lawes’.44 
For Rutherford therefore the Church is ruled by its officers appointed immediately by Christ, 
but through the mediation of its visible institutions. Indeed, with Gerson and Almain, 
Rutherford insisted that the pattern of the Church’s government was by councils or synods. He 
strenuously denied that this was simply a popish innovation and defended to the hilt the 
fundamentally Christian character of the conciliar ideal.45 However, the situation was 
complicated for Rutherford, as indeed it had been for his late medieval predecessors, by the 
vexed question of the King’s relation to the Church.  Rutherford’s solution, much like Almain, 
was to appeal again to the vital distinction between the natural and supernatural order, 
integrating this into his wider theology of dominion.  The King takes up the sword to naturally 
defend the Church and has the power to command synods to convene. Although obliged to 
execute the Church’s command in synods, Rutherford is emphatic that this does not make him 
the servant of the Church.46 Yet this lordly power of the King is immediately balanced by the 
ministerial and supernatural power of the Church. While the Church has no coercive power 
over the King it certainly has ministerial power to rebuke him and resist his commands if they 
are to the detriment of the Church.  Moreover, while in civil legislation the King and the estates 
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are in some way conjunct, the King plays no role in ecclesiastical legislation. In the Due Right 
Rutherford therefore attacks in no uncertain terms those like John Wemyss who argued that 
Church canons derive all their authority from the King, as well as those who took the more 
moderate position that they derive from King and Church conjunct. This, he says, is a 
confounding of the two kingdoms and a confusion of the spiritual with the temporal.47 
Yet while it is easy to read Rutherford here simply as a classic defender of the celebrated 
Protestant ‘Two Kingdoms’ doctrine, it is notable that he draws on Gerson, as well as Protestant 
authorities, for his view that civil and ecclesiastical law are both ‘perfect in their own kind’.  
Moreover, Rutherford goes against the grain in affirming a simultaneous mutual subordination 
and mutual supremacy of Church and King. In terms of Church discipline the King is under 
the “sceptre of the King of saints” and must submit to his ministers in the Church. However, in 
terms of coercive power to enforce the Church’s decrees the King acting in Parliament is 
supreme. 48 In arguing this he draws explicitly on the Scots conciliarist John Mair.  For 
Rutherford warmly applauds his maxim concerning civil and ecclesiastical government ‘that 
they are not subordinate, that is, not one of them is above another’, even while denying his 
caveat that ‘neither of the two hath a commandement over another’.49 
For Rutherford, the right of resistance was founded in covenant, and backed-up by the estates’ 
coercive jurisdiction over the King. For his opponent John Maxwell this provided clear 
evidence that he and his fellow Protestant resistance theorists were simply borrowing from the 
principles of the Jesuits.50 Rutherford, however, utterly denied this charge, and in so doing 
helpfully defined for us the contours of his resistance theory. Firstly, Rutherford is clear that 
the doctrine that all civil power is ‘radically and originally seated in the communitie’ is not 
unique to the Jesuits but can be found in any Catholic and Protestant jurist worth their salt. It 
is at root, he suggests, a Conciliarist principle as well as a biblical one.  Indeed, Rutherford 
suggests that the Jesuits themselves, in complete contrast to the Conciliarists, abuse it by using 
it as a means of smuggling in their own claims to papal supremacy over Kings .51 Secondly, he 
is emphatic that the right of resistance is grounded entirely in self-preservation, whether this 
be natural or spiritual in nature. It is this that is ‘sinlesse natures birth-right’ meaning that in 
the case of tyranny the people have the right to resume government and even to depose the 
King.52 As he pungently put it, ‘people cannot divest themselves of defensive wars anymore 
than they can of nature’.53 However, thirdly, Rutherford holds with the Conciliarists that such 
action is only to be taken in cases of extreme necessity. Fourthly, he also insists, like Mair, that 
resistance cannot be a private action but that in order to be legitimate it must be authorised by 
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the estates.54  Finally, Rutherford is emphatic that in all resistance, as far as possible, the person 
of the King should be respected. While violence remains necessary just as much in a defensive 
and an offensive war, the killing of the King is to be regarded as unlawful. There remains an 
important sense for Rutherford in which the King’s person, as endowed with his office 
immediately from God, is sacred.55 
In light of this, Rutherford’s resistance theory appears considerably less radical than it has 
sometimes been portrayed. Certainly in denying private action and assassination he stops far 
short of the French monarchomach school. Likewise in his view that the people have the power, 
in cases of necessity, to depose the King, he echoes Mair and the Conciliarists.56 Yet if 
Rutherford was confident that the main outlines of his resistance theory were such that they 
could be upheld not only by fiery spirits like Buchanan and Knox but even by conservatives 
like Mair or convinced Royalists like Ninian Winzet, the defence of it in practice was quite 
another matter. In the preface to Lex Rex Rutherford sets out in no uncertain terms his reasons 
for writing the treatise.  As he says; 
He considered that popery and defection had made a large step in Britain, and that 
arbitrary government had over-swelled all banks of law, that it was now at the highest 
float, and that this sea approaching the farthest border of fancied absoluteness, was at 
the score of ebbing: and the naked truth is, prelates, a wild and pushing cattle to the 
lambs and flock of Christ, had made a hideous noyse, the wheeles of their chariot did 
run an equal pace with the blood-thirsty  mind of the daughter of Babell.57 
What Rutherford opposed therefore can be summed up in two words: absoluteness and prelacy.  
It was axiomatic to him that ‘the estates of Scotland have power to punish the King, if he labour 
to subvert religion and lawes’.58   
For Rutherford the witness of history made clear that the Stewart dynasty had long been prone 
to absolute ambitions. In his Lex Rex he is emphatic that the King of Scotland does not rule his 
kingdom as an absolute prince. Against James I’s famous work Basilikon Doron, which sought 
to vindicate his own claims to divine right, he drew on the Scottish chroniclers and political 
theorists John of Fordun, Hector Boece, John Mair and George Buchanan to demonstrate the 
ultimate supremacy of the estates.59 In proroguing parliament and instituting the personal rule, 
he saw Charles I as going beyond even his father’s theoretical absolutism.60 Where Charles I 
had gone utterly beyond the pale, however, was in attempting to impose the new prayer book 
and the episcopal structure of government on the Church of Scotland, as well as to forcibly 
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suppress the National Covenant in alliance with Catholic powers. Rutherford clearly saw the 
National Covenant as obliging all who signed it to defend the true religion with the sword. As 
he put it – invoking the more radical conciliar logic – ‘the reformation of religion is a personall 
act that belongeth to all, even to any one private person according to his place’. 61 The Scottish 
covenanting wars were not to be seen as an act of rebellion against a lawful King, but as a 
defence of the historic constitution and Protestant religion of Britain against domestic tyranny 
and foreign invasion.   
4. Real and Pretended Liberty of Conscience 
While couched above all in Scriptural and Conciliarist terms, the Lex Rex also made a number 
of important appeals to conscience. Thus, Rutherford claims that the conscience of the people 
can act as a court above the King and that the King’s pleasure cannot be the rule of national 
conscience.62 Referencing the dramatic events of 1638, which heralded the National Covenant, 
he also argued that the Confession – meaning the Scots Confession of 1560 – obliges resistance 
against a King who imposed a service book against the conscience of his people.63   
Given this stirring defence of the liberty of conscience, there seems, at least at first sight, to be 
a considerable irony in the fact that Rutherford’s anti-tolerationist arguments are also 
developed within a strongly Conciliarist framework. For the political notion of covenant or 
contract, with its associated notions of individual right and consent, has often been understood 
as not only paving the way for a constitutional framework of government but also as laying the 
foundation for Enlightenment notions of liberty of conscience and toleration. Locke, of course, 
stands as the paradigmatic example of this with his famous Letter concerning Toleration.  That 
Rutherford did not take such a path was due not only to the tension between objective and 
subjective right that we have already identified in his thought, but also, as we will see, to his 
very different understanding of conscience.64 Moreover, Rutherford wrote his Free Disputation 
in 1649 in the midst of a bewilderingly complex situation in Church and society, both on a 
domestic and international front, and at a time of increasing polarisation of positions.   
Appointed Professor of Divinity at St Andrews by a Covenanter regime who brooked no 
opposition to their rule – and who had indeed at the beginning of their reign forcefully denied 
an appeal to conscience by the Aberdeen Doctors concerning the matter of non-subscription of 
the Covenant – Rutherford was writing in justification of the Scottish Presbyterian position 
against increasing pleas for toleration emerging from moderate Presbyterians and Independents 
in England and New England, and which in Oliver Cromwell were soon to find an important 
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champion.65 Disappointed already in the hopes of a unified Presbyterian Church across the 
British Isles, he wrote to defend the ideal of a national Church in Scotland. Having been a 
member of the Westminster Assembly, which in 1647 had presented a new Confession of faith 
and liturgy, Rutherford was particularly concerned to defend these as divine instruments for 
enforcing unity and uniformity.66 
Despite the defeat of the Royalist party and the exile of the Aberdeen Doctors, some of whom 
he had charged with heresy at the Aberdeen Assembly of 1640, Rutherford also still remained 
deeply concerned about the threat of Arminianism – an ever present threat to his mind.67 The 
Free Disputation is therefore not only aimed against those like John Goodwin or John Dury 
who argued for breadth or liberty of conscience, but also, and perhaps especially, against the 
Arminian and Remonstrant party in the Netherlands who argued for liberty of conscience as a 
means of avoiding the strictures of the Synod of Dort. With an eye to both the domestic and 
international context, Rutherford was therefore particularly concerned to defend the right of 
the godly magistrate to suppress and punish heresy.68 Rutherford also saw the notion of the 
sovereignty of conscience, propounded by his opponents, as a doorway to scepticism and 
libertinism – one which he desired, of course, to keep firmly shut.  Without denying the claim 
of conscience, he thus firmly upheld the sovereignty of divine law as the supreme arbiter of all 
rights in Church and society.69 
Rutherford’s own exposition of the nature of conscience begins from a biblical standpoint: the 
Apostle Paul’s statement before Governor Festus of a ‘conscience void of offence toward God, 
and toward man’ – a definition which already suggests an intimate connection between 
conscience and divine law. According to Rutherford, conscience in the Bible stands for the 
heart and thus signifies the mind, understanding and will.70 This leads him to elaborate his 
understanding of conscience in dialogue with the faculty psychology of the Middle Ages.71  
According to Rutherford conscience is to be understood as ‘a power of the practicall 
understanding according to which the man is obliged and directed to give judgement of 
himselfe, that is of his state and condition, and of all his actions, inclinations, thoughts and 
words’.72 Taking sides in a scholastic controversy he holds that conscience is a power of the 
soul and not an act or even a habit. Against those scholastics who wish to view conscience as 
an inclination of the will, or of intellect and will combined, Rutherford argues for its seat in the 
practical intellect.73 In this he comes close to both Aquinas and Scotus.74 
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While Rutherford argued for conscience as an intellective power of the soul he did not thereby 
intend to separate it from either a habitual framework of action or from the will and the 
affections of the soul. In fact, he views conscience as a discursive faculty, which through the 
will, is able to command the whole soul. He thus utterly rejects a view of conscience which 
detaches it from principles of action.75 In line with his all-important distinction between a right 
and erring conscience he also distinguishes between conscience viewed abstractly as a power 
and conscience as it becomes embedded habitually in the human – or indeed angelic – soul.  
Indeed, for Rutherford, following a broad scholastic consensus, the operation of conscience is 
syllogistic. Conscience thus formulates a major proposition drawing on synderesis as the 
habitual knowledge of the principles of natural law inscribed in every human soul. As an 
intellective power conscience acts as a witness proposing a minor proposition concerning the 
individual action under investigation. Finally, conscience combines these together to come to 
a concluding judgement or decision on the case. Blurring somewhat his earlier distinction 
between power, act and habit, Rutherford argues ‘it is but one and the same conscience acting 
all the three, the acts of Law, a Witnesse, a Judge’.76 Significantly, it was just such a position 
that Locke was seeking to break away from, in his emphatic claim that ‘Conscience is the judg 
not ye law’.77 
There is, however, a marked tension, even ambiguity, in Rutherford’s account of conscience, 
which is shaped by his Augustinian anthropology and his prevailing Anti-Arminianism. On the 
one hand Rutherford can speak of conscience in terms which echo even the most enthusiastic 
of its extollers. It is thus a ‘christall globe of reason’ and the ‘beame’ or ‘sunne’ of the soul. It 
is a divine power and ‘something of God’, even a ‘domestick little God’ and a ‘keeper sent 
from heaven’.78 On the other hand Rutherford attacks fiercely those who would ‘deify’ the 
conscience, or argue for conscience’s ‘royal prerogative’.79 He also denies, against the 
Arminians, that conscience is an indifferent or impartial judge, attacking his opponents’ 
assumption concerning its fundamental innocency.80 He would have surely found Locke’s view 
that the consequences of the Fall are irrelevant to the politics of conscience utterly 
unintelligible.81 
If this seems a contradiction, the resolution comes in Rutherford’s account of the relation 
between conscience, grace, and the law of God. For he is adamant that the Fall has corrupted 
the habitual knowledge of the natural law that humans originally had and thus polluted the act 
of conscience. The letters of the divine law are still inscribed on the soul but the ink has now 
become faded. Conscience still remains a bright light but its beams have become obscured by 
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clouds of sin.82 Conscience, like every other faculty of the human soul, must therefore be 
renewed through the grace of the Holy Spirit. Since conscience is fallible it must therefore 
always be held up to the divine light of revelation. Indeed, what Rutherford opposes is not the 
elevation of conscience per se, but the claim of his opponents, whether implicit or explicit, that 
conscience can function as a kind of parallel witness to Scripture, or – much worse – that it can 
be used to judge the interpretation of Scripture. In this sense he can argue that conscience is 
both an ‘under-witnesse and an observer with God’ and that it is a ‘blind and dimme beholder’ 
in comparison with him.83 At the same time, it is also clear to Rutherford that only a Christian 
can truly make the claim of having a good conscience before God, since only the Christian 
seeks to subordinate their conscience to the Law of God as revealed in Scripture.84 
Importantly, the Free Disputation combines this scriptural claim with a Conciliarist argument 
for the authority of the Church in Councils. This is directed against the Apology of the 
Remonstrants which asserted the great violence done to conscience by Synods of the Church, 
clearly with Dort in mind.85 Against this, Rutherford defends the right of Synods to coaction, 
providing that their decisions are in accordance with the Word of God. Drawing on the 
Reformation understanding of the fallibility of the Church, the Arminians argued for the right 
of individual consciences to judge propositions of Scripture. Without in any way denying their 
assumption, Rutherford responded that ‘a fallible Church may determine infallible points’.  
While here he does depart from the medieval Conciliarist thesis of an infallible Church, his 
claim that the decision of the Church in lawful synods is the decision of the Holy Spirit 
speaking in the Word of God carries more than an echo of Haec Sancta and the Council of 
Constance’s famous self-assertion that it was ‘legitimately assembled in the Holy Spirit’.86  
Indeed, Rutherford can hold that when the Church commands obedience to its decrees it is 
Christ himself who is doing so, through the ministerial office of the elders of the Church.87 
The principles of Scripture and Church in Council are those which Rutherford regards as 
sovereign over conscience and which effectively govern his discussion of all the individual 
cases discussed in the Free Disputation. As conscience conforms itself to those principles it 
can be viewed as a divine voice in the soul, as it departs from them it becomes erring and its 
claims only those of a ‘pretended liberty of conscience’. To see what this means it will be 
helpful to briefly survey two case-studies discussed by Rutherford which were key issues of 




In the war-torn and confessionally-divided Europe of the seventeenth century the quest to 
define the fundamentals of the Christian faith became increasingly important. In particular, the 
devastating events of the Thirty Years’ War, the hostilities of which had only come to an end 
a year before Rutherford penned the Free Disputation, had prompted renewed efforts to unite 
Reformed and Lutherans in order to establish a united Protestant front against the Catholic 
Habsburgs. Closer to home, concerns over the fissuring of the Protestant Church, and the 
confessional violence of the Civil Wars, were leading to attempts to delineate the fundamentals 
of the Christian faith in as inclusive a way as possible.88 For example, just a few years after 
Rutherford’s Free Disputation, Richard Baxter would launch the Association movement which 
sought to unite Presbyterians, Independents and Episcopalians around a minimalist confession 
grounded on the believer’s baptismal covenant with the Trinity.89 
Intimately connected to both these movements was the Scottish irenicist and ecumenicist John 
Dury, a fellow member of the Westminster Assembly with Rutherford and a former associate 
of the Aberdeen Doctors.90 Like Baxter, with whom he was to be closely connected, Dury 
sought to define the broadest possible terms of subscription in an attempt to unify the divided 
Church.91 Interestingly, Rutherford did not attack Dury directly. It may well be that he 
recognised that Dury’s political star was in the ascendant, but it also seems that he had a real 
respect for him. Indeed, in the Free Disputation he not only cited with approbation Dury’s 
tripartite division of the necessary points of the Christian religion, but also praised the efforts 
of the Leipzig Conference of 1631, which Dury had been closely involved in, to promote unity 
between Reformed and Lutherans.92 Moreover, like Rutherford, Dury was a firm believer in 
the Conciliar government of the Church.93 
Yet where Dury saw Church Councils as a means of ensuring cross-denominational unity 
through the drawing up of a common confession, Rutherford’s own Conciliarist principles led 
him to a diametrically opposite conclusion. He thus opposed the view of the irenic John 
Davenant, which was an inspiration for Dury, that the Protestant Church should try and draw 
up a general confession which both Reformed and Lutherans could agree to. According to 
Rutherford such general confessions are simply a ‘daubing of the matter with untempered 
mortar’. They are thus deceptive and a kind of ‘patching up’ of truth and falsehood. For 
inevitably both sides will interpret a general confession according to their own meaning so 
‘now the contrary senses of this confession makes them now not one generall, but two 




In similar vein, Rutherford also attacked the broader attempt, sponsored by Dury as well as 
others like Goodwin, to distinguish between the fundamentals of the Christian faith which must 
be held by all and the non-fundamental points in which there could be liberty of conscience.  
While Dury and Goodwin believed it to be a relatively easy matter to identify such 
fundamentals, Rutherford held the contrary view.  As he put it: 
To determine what is fundamentall, what not, and the number of fundamentall points, 
and the least measure of the knowledge of fundamentals, in which the essence of saving 
faith may consist, or the simple want of the knowledge of which fundamentalls, is 
inconsistent with saving faith in minimo quod non, is more than Magistrate or Church 
can well know. Sure it borders with one of Gods secrets, touching the finall state of 
salvation, or damnation, of particular men.95 
Rutherford also had a strong scepticism about the very meaning of the distinction between 
fundamentals and non-fundamentals. For him it was the synods of the Church, through 
Scripture, which had the authority to make confessions of faith – just as had happened at the 
Westminster Assembly. While these confessions did not presume to determine the 
fundamentals precisely, they could be taken as the authoritative voice of Christ through 
Scripture.  Individual conscience had no right to dissent from this, and if it did so, it became 
by definition erring conscience.96 
Given Rutherford’s view of the supreme authority of the Church in Synod, the question 
remained of who it was that should enforce the decision of the Church. According to 
Rutherford, this was the duty of both the civil and ecclesiastical authorities. Indeed, he argued 
that both can be considered as actually ‘compulsory of conscience’, providing that conscience 
is understood in terms of external liberty of action and not internal liberty to think, will, judge 
etc. – which he held that no one, including even God himself, could compel.97  Here, we 
actually may detect an important similarity not only with Cromwell, who described religious 
belief as ‘things of the minde’,98 but also with Locke’s famous definition of religion as the 
‘inward and full perswasion of the mind’.99 Yet, for Rutherford there could be no such sharp 
distinction between inward and outward. He thus insisted that even adiaphora came under the 
legislative purview of the magistrate – an issue over which he had already clashed bitterly on 
with the Aberdeen Doctors.100 For him – in direct contradiction to Cromwell and Locke – the 
‘conscience of things indifferent, is never indifferent’.101 
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For Rutherford, the upholding of liberty of conscience against the unity of the Church was at 
root a Donatist principle. It is no surprise then that he should turn to both Augustine and 
Lactantius in defining his own view of compulsion. Following Lactantius, Rutherford was 
adamant that ‘religion cannot be compelled’102 Nevertheless, he also viewed it to be a false 
inference, which Goodwin and others had clearly drawn, which then denied coercive power to 
the magistrate over heretics and false teachers. Rather, Rutherford held that magistrates were 
‘nursing fathers’ of the Church and that it was their duty to protect both it and its members 
from spiritual harm – a tenet which Locke later worked so hard to demolish in his Letter 
concerning Toleration.103 Indeed, where Locke held to an absolute distinction of civil and 
ecclesiastical concerns – famously going so far as to say that ‘civil government relates only to 
Mens Civil Interests … and hath nothing to do with the World to come’104 – for Rutherford 
they were absolutely inseparable. From Lactantius, he thus argued that the magistrate’s sword 
is no means of God to force positively to external worship but is a means negatively to punish 
false worship. In this sense, the magistrate does not command obedience but punishes 
omission.105   
While this might seem to us – and certainly did to Locke106 – like a somewhat empty distinction, 
it was vitally important for Rutherford. At the very least it served to distinguish the Christian 
community, within which the magistrate could enforce conscience, from the non-Christian 
community in which there could be no compulsion in religion. However, within Scotland at 
least, such a distinction would have been of little, if any, comfort for Rutherford’s opponents, 
as the Covenanter and Presbyterian ideal viewed Church and nation as coextensive – precisely 
the kind of mono-confessional notion which both Cromwell and Locke sought to dismantle.107  
Indeed, Rutherford maintained that through baptism all Scots had entered into this covenant 
and were therefore obliged by conscience to submit themselves to the ruling of the national 
Church. As in the Lex Rex, in order to justify this he would also likely appeal to the Conciliarist 
notion of tacit consent, in which individual consent became sublimated into the synodical 
structures of authority and the objective consent of the whole community.108 
5. Conclusion 
Much more work is needed to fully excavate Rutherford’s anti-tolerationist views, which we 
have seen, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, to be intimately linked to a carefully-crafted 
understanding of rights and conscience. For Rutherford, there seems to be a real sense in which 
toleration actually subverted true liberty of conscience and erected in its place a pretended 
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liberty of conscience. For him, this deifying of conscience, making it a judge over scriptural 
and ecclesiastical matters was nothing less than a form of idolatry.109 Of course there were 
many Christians at the time who vehemently disagreed with his anti-tolerationism, but we 
should at least understand Rutherford’s position as a way of holding together Church and 
society at a fraught time when centrifugal pressures were threatening to blow them violently 
apart.110 
We should also be clear in seeing in Rutherford’s views the continuation of the late medieval 
Conciliarist tradition, with all of its high ideals and tragic ambiguities. While he denounced 
‘papist tyranny of conscience’ in the Free Disputation, as well as the ‘lawless decrees of 
Councils and Popes’,111 what he opposed was really the non-scriptural nature of their decisions 
and not the Conciliarist basis on which they were upheld. Likewise, the manner in which 
Rutherford’s concern for unity ultimately trumped his concern for actual consent or liberty of 
conscience, was in many ways a replaying of fifteenth-century controversies. To see this, we 
need only recall the way in which Hus’ appeal to Scripture and conscience at the Council of 
Constance was ultimately received. Like Gerson and other Conciliarists, Rutherford was both 
animated by an anti-Donatist spirit and willing to resort to the sword to defend the unity of the 
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